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Abstract— This paper presents an empirical analysis for 24 Eu-
ropean countries that procure balancing power with auctions. We 
find that there is no predominant market design in Europe but 
qualitatively identify three key drivers for the variety in market 
designs: the share of volatile renewable energy sources, short-
term flexibility and market coupling. The inconsistency of 
auction designs, however, cannot be traced back to the energy 
market framework conditions. We argue that this is a conse-
quence of the applied multi-part auction mechanism and offer a 
brief review of auction-theoretic literature. 
 
Index Terms—Auction Design, Balancing Power, Control Power, 
Market Design, Power Reserve 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The European electricity markets face tremendous trans-
formations by the growing use of renewable energy sources. 
Volatility on the production side will increase and the power 
system will require additional flexibility, which can be en-
sured by harmonizing the European electricity markets [1]. 
Furthermore, a unified European electricity market will lead to 
a higher degree of competition and in the long-term promote 
efficiency. Harmonization is not restricted to energy-only 
markets but should also include balancing power procurement 
[2]. 
 
A secure operation of electric devices requires a constant 
frequency in alternating current power grids. If too much (lit-
tle) energy is supplied to the grid, the frequency will rise (drop) 
. Hence, electricity supply and demand need to be bal-anced 
permanently. Since electricity can be stored neither easily nor 
cheaply, there is a necessity for an ancillary service  
– the so-called balancing power. If the frequency drops (rises) 
positive (negative) balancing power is needed, e.g. by increas-ing 
(decreasing) the load level of a power plant. The European 
Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E) dis-
cerns three “qualities” of balancing power (“three-quality pat-
tern”), namely the Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR), the 
Frequency Restoration Reserve (FRR) and the Replacement 
Reserve (RR) [3]. First, FCR is used to limit deviations from the 




and as a final measure RR is activated. All prequalified sup-
pliers that are allocated for the provision of balancing power 
need to keep available the offered amount of power and, if 
called for frequency stabilization, provide balancing energy. 
Thus, suppliers need to be compensated for keeping balancing 
power available and for the actual delivery of balancing ener-
gy. This is implemented by allowing suppliers to submit two 
different bids: the power bid (EUR/MW) and the energy bid 
(EUR/MWh). 
 
A continued Europe-wide cooperation requires a profound 
understanding of the current design characteristics in balanc-
ing power markets. In order to facilitate this understanding we 
present an overview of current European balancing power 
market designs. We analyze 24 European countries that are 
members within the ENTSO-E and procure balancing power 
with procurement auctions. Based on the aggregated infor-
mation we conduct a qualitative analysis of potential drivers 
for current market designs. The analysis leads to a critical 
evaluation of current theoretical approaches towards the de-
sign of multi-part procurement auctions. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: In section II, the ap-
plied method for the empirical study is presented, introducing 
the characteristics that are used for the analysis. Section III 
discusses three main drivers for the current configurations of 
the European market designs. Section IV reflects heterogenei-
ty in auction design by considering applicable theoretical 
work. Section V concludes. 
 
II. METHOD  
This analysis of the European balancing power markets 
uses a structural framework: We analyze every market along 
three categories of characteristics to be described below. As 
market designs vary considerably, minor simplifications of the 
real market structures were inevitable. We provide supplemen-
tary information by way of additional download material (cf. 
note for Table 1). 
 
First, general energy market characteristics have strong 
implications for the design of markets for ancillary services. 
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Historically, the key driver for power market design is the 
electricity mix. Availability of different resources and energy 
carriers fundamentally shapes the market structure. We specif-
ically report the share of gross electricity consumption served 
from volatile renewable energy sources (vRES), namely pro-
duction from wind and photovoltaics. The vRES-share is used as 
an indicator for this increasing volatility, which could have a 
significant impact on required balancing power and implica-tions 
for the design of these markets [4], [5]. As the necessity for a 
flexible adjustment of production levels is sometimes known in 
advance, some countries implemented short-term trading options 
on their spot market. The spot market is com-monly divided in 
day-ahead and intraday markets. Day-ahead markets allow 
trading for the following day whereas intraday markets allow load 
serving entities to avoid balancing activi-ties by trading for 
delivery on the same day. We report the shortest time before 
physical delivery when a spot market trading option is still 
available, in order to investigate a possi-ble impact on the design 
of balancing markets [cf. 6]. 
 
Secondly, balancing market characteristics describe the 
implementation of each balancing power market quality (FCR, 
FRR and RR). First, we examine whether the three-quality pattern 
is applied or if certain market qualities are non-existent. If 
existent, we report for each market quality whether the provision 
of balancing energy is a compulsory service or is procured with 
the help of an auction. In case of the latter, we present the bid 
elements (power and/or energy bid) and whether positive and 
negative balancing power are distin-guished. Furthermore, the 
auction frequency (yearly, monthly, weekly, daily) as well as the 
activation strategy (merit-order or pro -ratio/parallel) are 
discussed. Lastly, the number of deliv-ery time slices, their 
duration (e.g. 24x1h for a daily procure-ment) and the minimum 
power offer are stated, since these are fundamental to assess a 
particular market’s flexibility. 
 
Finally, auction characteristics discuss pricing and scoring 
rules of the respective markets. Pricing options are uniform 
pricing, pay-as-bid or a combination of these, and have signif-
icant impact on the bidding behavior of suppliers [7]. The 
scoring rule describes how the winners of the auction are de-
termined. 
 
Leaning on the detailed analysis of the relevant character-
istics of balancing markets in Europe, we deduct main drivers for 
their design. The factual information is qualitatively ag-gregated 
into tangible findings and illustrated through the use of specific 
market examples. In addition to the compilation of fundamental 
characteristics of balancing markets on a Europe-an scale, 
identifying main drivers for balancing market design can 




In this chapter we present our main findings. Table 1 de-
picts an extensive comparison of 24 European balancing pow-
er market designs. After the discussion of descriptive findings, 
we identify three key drivers for the current configurations of 
the balancing power markets. Furthermore, we examine the 
remarkable heterogeneity in auction designs. 
 
A. Descriptive Results 
 
We find a wide range of gross electricity consumption 
served from vRES among the 24 evaluated countries, span-
ning from 0% in Serbia and Iceland to almost 45% in Den-
mark. In 21 countries there are intraday trading options for 
energy which, however, does not imply equal levels of flexi-
bility: More than half of these countries have trading options 
of 60min or less before delivery, whereas especially southern 
European countries such as Portugal, Spain and Italy can trade 
only up to 195min before delivery. 19 countries apply the 
three-quality pattern introduced by the ENTSO-E. While FRR 
is part of nearly every market, FCR and RR are not as abun-
dantly used. Especially smaller countries often compel market 
players to supply FCR or even rely on larger neighboring 
countries for this service, such as Russia for the Baltic states. 




Regarding auction design, nearly every constellation of 
power bid and/or energy bid is applied throughout the three 
qualities. 23 countries generally distinguish positive from neg-
ative balancing power, especially for FRR and RR. One ex-
emption is the FCR -cooperation between Austria, Germany, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland which procures FCR without 
the distinction of positive and negative balancing power 
(symmetric product). Only Italy is not distinguishing between 
the products at all. The frequency of balancing power pro-
curement is highly diverse, ranging from a daily to a yearly 
auction. The activation strategy for balancing energy on the 
other hand is almost consistent throughout the European mar-
kets: Merit-order activation is used unanimously, merely Ser-
bia activates pro- ratio/parallel. The number of time slices, 
their duration and the minimum size of the power offer vary 
greatly between the countries and balancing power qualities. 
With regard to the applied pricing rule, the picture is also in-
coherent: In ten countries uniform and in eleven countries pay-
as-bid pricing is used. If uniform pricing is used for the 
delivery of balancing energy, this price either depends on an 
exogenous market price or on the submitted energy bids of the 
suppliers. The scoring rule is either based on a total price for 
balancing power and energy, only on the price for balancing 
power or on a stochastic optimization program minimizing 
total costs. 
 
B. Share of Volatile Renewable Energy Sources 
 
Generally, integrating vRES into the power system can have 
two opposing effects on the balancing market: On the one hand, 
more vRES generally induce higher production fluctuations and 
more balancing power is needed. As a result, the price for 
balancing should increase. On the other hand, vRES with low 
marginal costs reduce spot and intraday prices and may push the 
existing power plants out of the merit-order. As a consequence, 
displaced conventional production capacity pushes onto the 
balancing market and reduces prices there. However, an isolated 
operation on the balancing power market is not viable for 
conventional base-load power plants with high ramp-up costs. If 
regulators do not want to subsidize de-  
 
1 Note that we report details for automatic activation for both FCR and FRR 
markets by default, since it is more common for these qualities. For further 
market details please refer to the supplementary download material. 
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ficient conventional power plants, balancing energy must in the 
long-run be supplied by vRES. The balancing market inte-gration 
of vRES can reduce balancing costs [8] along with further 
omitting carbon emissions by conventional production. 
 
Our analysis shows that countries with higher shares of 
vRES predominantly have flexible auctioning procedures as 
apparent in a greater number of time slices with shorter maxi-
mum durations. Furthermore, auction frequencies are higher 
and the minimum size of power offers tends to be smaller. 
 
We discuss two exemplary markets, France and Denmark, to 
elucidate the transition from a market with a high share of 
conventional production towards a market with a very high share 
of wind power plants. While both countries have sub-stantially 
reduced their CO2-emissions in recent years [9] they achieved this 
with very divergent production mixes, market structures and 
liberalization levels. In France less than 6% of the electricity 
consumed is supplied from vRES while about 77% of the 
electricity consumed is produced in nuclear power plants, the 
highest share in the world [10]. Consequently, these power plants 
are obliged to provide FCR and FRR to the grid. The French 
auction-based market for RR has changed very little since 2003 
[11]. The auction takes place once a year al-locating blocks of 
positive and negative RR. Since just two big power plant 
operators operate on the market the surcharg-es are flexibly 
allocated to the power plants within each port-folio. Therefore, the 
operator is able to compensate unavaila-ble production capacity 
within their portfolio. 
 
Denmark on the other hand, driven by a very high share of 
wind power integration, opened the balancing market for 
vRES. Wind power generation in Denmark corresponded to a 
share of about 42% of the Danish electricity consumption in 
2014 (cf. Table 1). The wind parks are owned by various 
companies. Balancing power procurement like in France 
would not be suitable since the small suppliers are not able to 
provide balancing power for a whole year with their limited 
production capacity and volatile production. Therefore, Den-
mark changed their markets towards vRES market integration 
in three steps: (1) Denmark installed a system to easily 
prequalify wind power plants for balancing provision, (2) 
made the auction process available for more participants by 
performing auctions daily and (3) reduced the traded time 
slices to a length of four (FCR) and one hour (FRR and RR)  
[12]. The wind energy feed-in forecasts are reliable enough to 
estimate wind production for the following day and to precise-
ly assess available gas power capacity to be placed on the bal-
ancing market. The Danish system was the first to integrate 
vRES into the energy system and now serves as an innovation 
example for future, flexible market structures. 
 
C. Short-Term Flexibilty 
 
Except for the Czech Republic, Iceland and Serbia, all Eu-
ropean countries introduced intraday markets that are either based 
on a regular auction (e.g. Spain and Portugal in order to bundle 
liquidity) [13] or on continuous trading (all others) during the day 
of delivery. The TSO receives binding produc-tion plans of every 
power plant operator within its grid area. Depending on the 
market structure, operators are allowed to change this plan until a 
certain time before delivery. Changes in production have to be 
balanced on the intraday market for 
 
as long as possible. Only the resulting imbalances after the market 
closure are balanced by the TSO, who in turn procured the 
balancing energy earlier on the balancing market. 
 
In Germany two different intraday markets are available: 
The intraday auction and the intraday continuous market [14]. 
The former was introduced at the end of 2014 and is an addi-
tional measure to balance the increasing power supply from 
solar power plants on the day before delivery [15]. The latter 
allows trading until 30min before delivery within the entire 
market area since 2011 and therefore is especially relevant for 
fluctuations in wind energy supply. By introducing two com-
plementary intraday markets, the German electricity market 
became highly flexible and can balance volatile supply with-
out an increased demand for balancing power [16]. In fact, the 
procured balancing capacity fell by 20% between 2008 and the 
end of 2015 [17]. 
 
As the example of Germany shows, we argue that short-
term flexibility on intraday markets reduces the demand for 
balancing power in other European countries. Nevertheless, a 
more rigorous evaluation of this hypothesis is a promising 
topic for further research. 
 
D. Market Coupling 
 
Beyond the consideration of individual national market de-
signs, we want to address a trend for international cooperation 
via coupling of national electricity markets. Market coupling 
describes the act of joining physically connected but systemat-
ically separated markets via implicit auctions on the respective 
trading platforms. In coupled markets cross-border transmis-
sion capacity is not traded in explicit auctions but rather part 
of the pricing procedure on national power exchanges. Infra-
structure can therefore be used more efficiently and the result-
ing greater market area has more participants and a higher 
liquidity. On the spot market coupling is already being applied 
and should result in increased competition and lower prices. 
Nevertheless, this trend is relevant for all power markets and 
is a stepping stone towards a single European market [6], [18]. 
In the case of balancing power a positive balancing require-
ment in one balancing region can often be compensated with a 
negative one in another. By coupling balancing markets, this 
pooling effect can be harnessed through an economic mecha-
nism and lead to higher supply security. The effect was e.g. 
observable upon the introduction of cooperation mechanisms 
between the four TSOs in Germany in the springs of 2009 and 
2010: Immediately after introduction, dispatched balancing 
energy significantly dropped along with monthly volatility 
[19]. 
 
Further efforts aim to promote the international coopera-
tion between TSOs and eventually drive joining of markets. 
Table 1 shows that the fundamental structure of balancing 
markets in Europe is homogenous: Most employ the categori-
zation into three quality levels and differentiate between posi-
tive and negative balancing power. With the help of the 
ENTSO-E further convergence in market design is foreseea-
ble. Such reconciliation would lead to additional cost reduc-
tions and efficiency gains in the procurement of balancing 
power. In an initial step, the “International Grid Control Co-
operation” (IGCC) of TSOs in Denmark, Germany, the Neth-
erlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, the Czech Republic 
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and most recently France, closely cooperate for the minimiza-
tion of FRR-activation. Their respective net balancing needs 
are communicated and cleared, therefore compensating oppo-
site requirements [20]. Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland also have a joint market for 793 MW of FCR. A 
maximum of 30% (at least 90 MW) of the national FCR-need 
can be exported to partnering countries, which has led to sig-
nificant cost reductions after initiation [21]. Especially smaller 
markets may profit from more participants and higher liquidity 
through joint markets. In fact, Denmark currently considers 
participating in the existing scheme [22]. 
 
If balancing markets continue to converge, a further cost 
reduction for balancing power can lead to a higher market 
efficiency and therefore to an increase in public welfare. The 
ENTSO-E offers a viable platform for this process. 
 
IV. INCONSISTENCY IN AUCTION DESIGN ELEMENTS 
 
As seen in the previous sections, some of the market de-sign 
elements can be traced back to the respective conditions of the 
power system. However, the greatly varying scoring and pricing 
rules do not directly correspond to the framework conditions. 
Moreover, they have a direct impact on the bid-ding behavior of 
the suppliers. We approach this discontinuity by considering the 
relevant theoretical auction design litera-ture. From a theoretical 
stance, balancing power is procured in multi-part auctions since 
bidders must be compensated for both reserving capacity and 
delivering balancing energy if called for. This type of auction is 
discussed for the procure-ment of a wide range of goods, e.g. for 
highways construction  
[23] or for weapon system tenders [24]. Procuring balancing 
power with multi-part auctions was first analyzed by [25]. 
They develop necessary conditions for scoring rules that result 
in efficient winner selection. Based on this work, [26] find that 
a scoring rule using only the power bid will incentivize bid-
ders to reveal their true costs, if the uniform spot price is paid 
for actual energy supply. However, this specific design is not 
applied in any of the 24 European countries. There are coun-
tries that base the scoring rule on the power bid exclusively 
and apply uniform pricing, e.g. Portugal and Spain for FRR 
procurement. Yet here, the uniform price is based on the utili-
zation of RR. 
 
Current scientific work comments on the theorized auction 
design by [26] and argues why it is not applied in practice. 
Reference [27] states that efficiency problems occur when 
applying the proposed scoring rule. Reference [28] shows that 
power plants with variable costs above the spot price would 
generate losses if they provided balancing energy and were 
paid the spot price. Hence, the theorized pricing rule is only 
beneficial for power plants that have variable costs below the 
spot price and therefore it only provides an incentive for mar-
ket participation in this specific case. 
 
Furthermore, we argue that efficient balancing activation 
cannot be achieved with this pricing rule: If no energy bids are 
submitted, activation according to variable costs is not possi-ble. 
But even if energy bids were submitted, there is no incen-tive for 
suppliers to bid their true variable costs. In the case of pro-
ratio/parallel activation, every load serving entity would be 
utilized equally for the delivery of balancing energy and in 
consequence does not enable efficient activation. If merit- 
 
order activation is applied, rational suppliers with variable 
costs below the spot price should be willing to provide balanc-
ing energy as often as possible. A high probability of being 
called for the provision of balancing energy is connected to a 
low position in the merit-order and can be achieved by submit-
ting a low energy bid. However, under the proposed pricing 
rule bidders receive a uniform spot price regardless of their 
submitted energy bids. Thus, rational suppliers with variable 
costs below the spot price should submit the lowest energy bid 
allowed. In this equilibrium, all suppliers submit an energy bid 
of 0 EUR/MWh and thus an efficient activation is, again, not 
possible. 
 
In conclusion, the heterogeneity in auction design could be 
a consequence of the complexity of multi-part auctions for 
balancing power procurement. National regulators define their 
own design due to the lack of theoretical research on robust 




This paper presents an overview of existing balancing 
power market designs in Europe. We investigate the 24 coun-
tries that are members of the ENTSO-E and procure balancing 
power with the help of public procurement auctions. We find 
that there is no predominant market design. Certain elements 
of this heterogeneity (e.g. auction frequency, timing, duration 
of time slices) seem to be influenced by the framework condi-
tions of the respective energy market. We identify three key 
drivers for these conditions: the share of vRES in the energy 
mix, the short-term flexibility for energy trading and pan-
European market coupling. On the other hand, the incon-
sistency in auction design seems to be caused by the com-
plexity of multi-part auctions for balancing power procure-
ment. 
 
Further research could focus on a quantitative investiga-
tion of balancing power market performance under different 
auction designs. In e.g. Germany there is an on-going debate 
whether uniform pricing is superior to pay-as-bid pricing with 
respect to possible cost reductions [29], [30]. Secondly, a 
comprehensive quantitative analysis of the hypothesized key 
drivers for balancing power design is necessary. 
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  TABLE I. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FOR 24 EUROPEAN POWER MARKETS   
 
        
 
 Energy market characteristics Balancing power market characteristics Auction characteristics 
 
        
 




 (2014)1 trading option (automatic) (automatic) rule rule 
 
Austria 7.3% 30min 
PB; s; w; PB&EB; ; w; PB&EB; ; w; 
PaB lowest PBs 
 
m.-o.; Mo-Fr 8am-  
m.-o.; 1x168h; 1MW m.-o.; 42x4h; 5MW     8pm, rest; 5MW           
 
Belgium 9.2% 5min 
TP; ; m; PB&EB; ; m; PB&EB; ; y; 
PaB SP 
 
n/a.; base, peak, m.-o.; base, peak, n/a.; base, peak, 
 




PB; s; d; PB; ; d; PB; s; d; 
UP lowest PBs  
Republic n/a; 24x1h; n/a m.-o.; 24x1h; n/a m.-o.; 24x1h; n/a      
 
Denmark   PB; ; d; PB; s; m; PB&EB; ; d; UP (DK1), 
n/a 
 
44.7% 60min m.-o.; 24x1h; PaB&UP  
(DK1/DK2) n/a; 6x4h; 0,3MW n/a; 24x1h; 10MW    0,3MW (DK2)         
 
Estonia 8.7% 60min 
provided by TP; n/a; n/a; TP; ; n/a; 
PaB n/a  
russian TSO m.-o.; 24x1h; 5MW n/a; 24x1h; 5MW       
 
Finland 1.4% 60min 
n/a; s; n/a; EB; ; n/a; 
non-existent UP n/a  
n/a; 24x1h; 1MW m.-o.; 24x1h; 10MW        
 
France 5.6% 30min 
compulsory, compulsory, TP; ; y; 
PaB n/a  
regulated prices regulated prices m.-o.; n/a; 10MW       
 
Germany 18.2% 30min 
PB; s; w; PB&EB; ; w; PB&EB; ; d; 
PaB lowest PBs 
 
m.-o.; Mo-Fr 8am-  
m.-o.; 1x168h; 1MW m.-o.; 6x4h; 5MW     8pm, rest; 5MW           
 
Hungary 1.9% 120min 
PB; ; n/a; PB&EB; ; n/a; PB&EB; ; n/a; 
PaB n/a  
n/a; 24x1h; n/a m.-o.; 24x1h; n/a m.-o.; 24x1h; n/a       
 
Iceland 0.0% Day-ahead 
TP; s; w; TP; s; w; TP; ; w; 
UP lowest TPs  
m.-o.; 24x1h; 1MW m.-o.; 24x1h; 1MW m.-o.; 24x1h; 1MW       
 
Italy 13.1% 250min 
compulsory, EB; s; d; EB; s; d; 
PaB n/a  
regulated prices m.-o.; 24x1h; 1MW m.-o.; 24x1h; 1MW       
 
Latvia 2.1% 60min 
provided by manual: n/a; ; n/a; 
non-existent n/a n/a  
russian TSO m.-o.; 24x1h; n/a        
 
Lithuania 13.7% 60min 
provided by manual: TP; n/a; d; TP; n/a; d; 
UP lowest TPs  




PB; s; w; PB&EB; ; d/y; PB&EB; ; d/y; PaB & lowest PBs 
 
Netherlands m.-o.; 1x168h; 1MW m.-o.; n/a; 4MW m.-o.; n/a; 20MW UP (FCR), n/a    
 
Norway 2.0% 60min 
PB; s/; d/w; PB&EB; ; w; 
non-existent UP n/a  
n/a; 24x1h; 1MW m.-o.; n/a; 1MW        
 
Poland 6.0% 180min 
EB; ; n/a; EB; ; n/a; EB; ; n/a; 
UP SP  
n/a; 24x1h; n/a n/a; 24x1h; n/a m.-o.; 24x1h; n/a       
 
Portugal 27.9% 195min 
compulsory, PB; ; d; PB; ; d; 
UP lowest PBs  
no compensation m.-o.; 24x1h; n/a m.-o.; 24x1h; n/a       
 
Romania 18.4% 90min 
compulsory, TP; ; d; TP; ; d; 
UP lowest TPs  
no compensation m.-o.; 24x1h; n/a m.-o.; 24x1h; n/a       
 
Slovenia 2.1% 60min 
compulsory, PB&EB; n/a; y; PB&EB; n/a; y; 
PaB n/a  
no compensation m.-o.; 24x1h; n/a m.-o.; 24x1h; n/a       
 
Spain 28.3% 195min 
compulsory, PB&EB; ; d; PB&EB; ; d; 
UP lowest PBs  
no compensation m.-o.; 24x1h; n/a m.-o.; 24x1h; n/a       
 
Sweden 9.2% 60min 
PB&EB; s; d/w; PB&EB; ; w; 
non-existent PaB n/a  
n/a; 24x1h; n/a m.-o.; n/a; n/a        
 
       lowest PBs 
 
Switzerland 1.6%2 60min PB; s; w; PB; s; w; PB; ; w; PaB (FCR), 
 
   m.-o.; 1x168h; 1MW m.-o.; n/a; 5MW m.-o.; 6x4h; 1MW  SP 
 
       (FRR, RR) 
 
Serbia 0,0% Day-ahead non-existent 
TP; ; d; TP; ; d; 
UP lowest TPs  
p; 24x1h; n/a n/a; 24x1h; n/a        
 
United   PB&EB; ; m; PB&EB; ; m; PB&EB; s; m;    
11.9% 75min n/a; Mo-Fr, Sa, Su; n/a; Mo-Fr, Sa, Su ; n/a; Mo-Fr, Sa, Su; PaB n/a  
Kingdom    
10MW 10MW 50MW         
   
For supplementary information on the sources for this table please refer to the following document: http://games.econ.kit.edu/img/Comments_Sources_Design_of_European_Balancing_Power_Markets.pdf 
 
Abbreviations: manual=manual activation; PB=power bid and/or EB=energy bid or TP=total price; s=symmetric product (no distinction between positive and negative balancing energy) or ±=distinction between  
positive and negative balancing energy; procurement: d=daily, w=weekly, m=monthly or y=yearly; m.-o.=merit-order activation of balancing energy or p=pro-ratio/parallel activation of balancing energy; 24x1h=24 
one-hour time slices per day; 5MW=minimum power offer is 5MW; PaB=Pay-as-Bid pricing or UP=Uniform pricing (for EB and/or PB); SP=Stochastic Programming or lowest PBs/TPs=lowest capacity bids/total 
prices are considered until balancing demand is met; n/a=not available (e.g. not published)  
1 Ratio between net electricity produced from wind and solar power and the electrical energy available for consumption.  
2 Ratio between gross electricity consumption from wind and photovoltaics and the final net electricity consumption.  
 
Postprint of the article “Desing of European Balacing Power Markets” presented 2016 13th International 
Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM), Porto, Portugal, 6–9 June 2016, Art.Nr. 7521193, IEEE, 
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